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intraregionial exchange rate stability and regional  nominal exchange rate stability to a basket of tripolar
economic growth. They argue that:  currencies (the U.S. dollar, the Japanese yen, and the
*  For developing countries, exchange rate volatility  euro). This alternative would better reflect the region's
tends to significantly hurt trade and investment, making  diverse structure of trade and foreign direct investment.
it inadvisable to adopt a system of freely floating  The authors envision no rigid peg. Instead, at least
exchange rates.  initially, each country could choose its own formal
*  Given the high share of intraregional trade and the  exchange rate arrangement-be  it a currency board, a
similarity of trade composition  in East Asia, exchange  crawling peg, or a basket peg with wide margins. At
rate policy should be directed toward maintaining  times of crisis, the peg might be temporarily suspended,
intraregional exchange rate stability, to promote  trade,  subject to the rule that the exchange rate would be
investmerit, and economic growth.  restored to the original level as soon as practical. Only in
*  The current  policy of maintaining exchange rate  extreme circumstances would the level be adjusted to
stability against the U.S. dollar as an informal,  reflect new equilibrium conditions.
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This paper discusses major conceptual and empirical issues relevant to the exchange rate
policies of East Asian countries and proposes a regional exchange rate arrangement designed to
promote intra-regional exchange rate stability and regional economic growth.  In particular, it
argues that: (1) for developing countries, exchange rate volatility tends to have significantly
adverse effects on trade and  investment, making it inadvisable to  adopt a  system of  freely
floating exchange rates; (2) given the high degree of intra-regional trade and the similarity of
trade composition in East Asia, exchange rate policy should be directed towards maintaining
intra-regional exchange rate stability so as to promote trade, investment and economic growth;
and (3) in view of the current sub-optimal policy of maintaining exchange rate stability against
the US  dollar as  an  informal and  uncoordinated mechanism of  ensuring intra-regional rate
stability, a coordinated action may be profitably exploited to shift the target of nominal exchange
rate stability to a basket of tri-polar currencies (the US dollar, the Japanese yen, and the euro) as
an alternative numeraire which is more reflective of the diversity of trade and foreign direct
investment structure.
In light of these considerations, the paper proposes that a  coordinated action by East
Asian countries to stabilize their currencies against a common basket of major currencies (which
is broadly representative of their average structure of trade and foreign direct investment) will
contribute to the simultaneous stabilization of intra-regional exchange rates along with effective
exchange rates, in  a way consistent with the continued medium-term objective of promoting
trade, investment and growth in the region.  No rigid peg is envisaged, however.  At least
initially, each country is allowed to choose its own formal exchange rate arrangement in the
conduct of exchange rate policy, be it a currency board, a crawling peg or a basket peg with wide
margins.  In a time of crisis, the peg may be temporarily suspended, subject to the rule hat the
exchange rate will be restored to  the original level as soon as practical.  Only in  extreme
circumstances, the level  may be  adjusted to  reflect new equilibrium conditions.  Such an
arrangement is a pragmatic policy option for East Asia until greater political and institutional
developments create an environment conducive to a more robust framework of monetary and
exchange rate policy cooperation.
In some quarters of the academic and policymaking communities, there is an increasingly
popular view that, in a world of high capital mobility, most countries have little alternative but to
float their currencies or to "lock them in" through a currency board or a  common currency
arrangement (Eichengreen 1999b). In one of the earliest statements of this view, Obstfeld and
Rogoff (1995), for example, argued that a fixed exchange rate was costly if the government's
promise not  to  devalue lacked  credibility, and that  it  was becoming  increasingly difficult
nowadays to develop and maintain such credibility.  Thus, according to this view, unless the
government concerned was willing to assume the obligations of a rigid peg, the only other viable
choice would be to float its currency. This choice in exchange rate policy available to countries
with open capital accounts has been termed the "two corner-solution."  Undoubtedly, there is
some merit in this argument, insofar as the massive volume of international capital flows has
made the maintenance of exchange rate pegs more difficult, and enhanced the value of currency
flexibility as a buffer against shocks (Eichengreen 1  999a).2
We do not necessarily share this "two corner solution" view of exchange rate policy,
particularly as a sensible policy prescription for East Asia, because we believe that the objective
of  exchange rate policy  is multidimensional.  While the "two corner solution"  view  gives
exclusive attention to the objective of crisis prevention, countries can rightly pursue growth,
trade promotion, and other objectives through their use of exchange rate policy.  As Frankel
(1999) has  argued, the  optimal exchange rate  regime depends  on  the  circumstances of  a
particular country and time, and that there is no single regime that should fit all emerging market
economies.  In the context of East Asia, the many potential benefits of free floating seem to be
outweighed by its potential costs.  In fact, when the specific circumstances and needs of East
Asia are properly understood, it becomes apparent that what is desirable is a policy designed to
ensure  intra-regional  exchange  rate  stability  (so  as  to  promote  trade  and  foreign  direct
investment) while minimizing the potential for large exchange rate movements disruptive of
resource allocation within the region and ensuring stable capital inflows from outside the region
(so as to promote growth).  The purpose of this paper is to articulate the basis for such an
exchange rate policy and to explore its ingredients.
The paper  is  organized as  follows.  Section II  considers the  recent  experience  of
emerging market economies with exchange rate floats, focusing on the economies'  observed
practice of  exchange rate  stabilization under  floating exchange rate  arrangements, offering
possible explanations for such practice, and summarizing  the empirical evidence on the effects of
exchange rate volatility on trade, investment and growth. Section III discusses the characteristics
of East Asian countries in terms of their preparedness for a coordinated regional exchange rate
arrangement (if not monetary union), including the applicability  of optimal currency area criteria,
the characteristics of trade shares and composition, the nature of economic shocks, and the speed
of adjustment to those shocks.  Section IV presents some quantitative assessment of the impact
of  exchange rate  fluctuations among major currencies on  East Asian  economies based  on
structural vector autoregression.  Section V discusses the multidimensional nature of exchange
rate policy objectives for East Asia, and assesses the implications of the de facto  dollar peg
policy which was pursued by most of the East Asian countries prior to the currency crisis of
1997 and during the more recent, post-crisis period.  Section VI presents a case for a regional
approach to achieve the compelling objective of intra-regional exchange rate stability in East
Asia  and  discusses some  of  the technical  issues involved in  the management  of  such  an
arrangement,  including  the  need  for  institution  building.  Finally,  Section  VII  presents
concluding remarks.
II.  RECENT  EXPERIENCES  WITH FLOATING  EXCHANGE  RATES  IN EMERGING
MARKET  ECONOMIES
1. The Practice of Floating
Along with greater capital account convertibility, there has been a marked trend, at least
in  official  classification,  towards  greater  exchange  rate  flexibility  among  the  developing
countries in  recent years.  For example, according to  the classification of the International
Monetary Fund  (IMF),  the  share of  its  developing member countries with  some  form  of
exchange rate flexibility rose from a little over 15 percent of total in 1978 to about 50 percent in
1999 (authors'  estimates; see also Mussa, Masson, Swoboda, Jadresie, Mauro, and Berg 20003
and Kawai and Akiyama 2000).1 The shift to greater flexibility, however, has not always been
smooth.  Looking at the 29 instances in which countries moved from single-currency or basket
pegs to managed or independent floats during 1975-97,  Eichengreen (1999a) noted that the "exits
were typically preceded by  gradual nominal and real appreciation, and  followed by  a  step
depreciation" and that growth had typically slowed in the period leading up to the "exit."  The
unfavorable manner in which the exits typically occurred might be due to the fact that they were
often involuntary, with many of the countries concerned being forced to abandon the pegs that
had turned out to be unsustainable (Quirk 1994).2
Perhaps for the same reason, the crisis-affected East Asian countries did not seem to reap
the full potential benefits of  free floating.  At least initially in  the economic crisis,  capital
outflows led to depreciation, which in turn caused further capital outflows and depreciation in a
vicious circle manner, as confidence fell.  Given the buildup of unhedged short-term external
debt, the  weaker rates  caused the private  sector balance sheets  to  deteriorate,  exerting  a
deflationary impact on the economy (Kawai 1998; also Stiglitz 1998 and Radelet and Sachs
1998). With the passage of time, on the other hand, the currencies began to strengthen, causing
the potential risk of damping the pace of budding economic recovery (Bayoumi, Eichengreen
and Mauro 2000).  Ogawa, Ito, and Sasaki (1999), for example,  have argued that the worst of the
Asian crisis (in the first half of  1998) came long after the currencies began floating.  This
experience in East Asia is consistent with the general rule that an overwhelming majority of
"currency crashes" are associated with output losses (Furman and Stiglitz 1998).
In view of this experience, the crisis-affected  East Asian countries began to stabilize their
exchange rates against the US dollar in the latter part of 1998 (Kawai and Akiyama 2000).  For
all of the crisis-affected countries of Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand,
roughly nine months of sustained exchange rate depreciation were followed by several months of
moderate appreciation.  Then, from around November 1998, the respective currencies began to
show relative stability against the US dollar (Figure 1).  To take a closer look at Korea, for
example, the standard deviation of daily exchange rate changes for the Korean won against the
US dollar, which increased from 46.6 (won per dollar) during the pre-crisis period (March 1990
to September 1997) to 224.3 during the crisis period (October 1997  to September 1998), declined
again during the post-crisis period (October 1998 to September 1999) to 50.2 (Park, Wang, and
Chung 1999). A similar pattern was observed for many other currencies in the region, including
those of non-crisis countries, except that the Singapore dollar and the New Taiwan dollar both
began to show relative stability against the US dollar much earlier (say, from around March
1998), while the Hong Kong dollar remained pegged to the US dollar throughout this period.
In terms of observed exchange rate stability against a major anchor currency, East Asia is
by no means a special case.  In fact, most of the so-called flexible exchange rate arrangements
adopted by emerging market economies have turned out to be highly managed.  In this context, a
considerable degree of difference has been observed between developed and emerging market
economies, regarding the manner of exchange rate floating.  Hausmann, Panizza, and  Stein
l Here, flexible  arrangements  are defined  broadly,  i.e., those  in which  the exchange  rate "is adjusted  according  to a
set of indicators, follows a managed float or is independently  floating."
2  As exceptions, Eichengreen (1999a) notes Poland (in the  1990s), Israel (in the  1980s), and  Singapore (in the
1  970s) as countries that experienced greater exchange rate flexibility when capital inflows placed upward exchange
rate pressure.4
(1999) have noted that emerging country floaters typically show a greater tendency to intervene
in the foreign exchange market, and that the "policy of benign neglect toward exchange rate
policy is restricted to a small number of (developed) countries."  To support such an exchange
rate policy, developing country floaters hold a far larger level of  foreign exchange reserves
relative to  monetary aggregates.  Interestingly, the currencies of such industrial countries as
Japan, the United States and the United Kingdom float much more freely than those of many
emerging market economies.  Emerging market economies seem to be particularly restricted in
their ability and willingness to  float their currencies freely, with a particular "index  of free
floating" for the emerging countries as a whole being one tenth the index for the three major
industrialized countries and one half the index for other developed floaters, while it is twice the
index for poorer developing countries (Hausmann, Panizza, and Stein 1999).
2. Explaining  the Manner  of Floating
As observed by Kawai and Akiyama (1998, 2000) for a large number of countries, the
reluctance of developing countries to float freely is a fairly general phenomenon, and has been
termed the "fear  of floating" by Calvo and Reinhart (2000a, b) who have come to the same
observation based on a smaller sample of countries.  In the case of East Asia, the recently
observed  attempts at  stabilization may  in  part  reflect the  authorities'  concerns  about  the
possibility of too rapid an appreciation when growth momentum was about to pick up.  More
generally, however, underlying the fear of floating may be the perception that floating exchange
rates  have  shown  a  considerable degree  of  volatility  that  is  unrelated to  macroeconomic
fundamentals, thereby increasing risk and uncertainty.  Exchange rate uncertainty may increase
the risk premium, hence the differential over major currency interest rates, adjusted for expected
exchange rate changes.  To  be sure, a  high risk premium is not  an  inevitable outcome of
exchange rate floating, particularly when stable macroeconomic policies are followed. 3 But it is
well known that deviations from uncovered interest parity (against major industrial countries'
interest rates) are large for developing countries in  general and particularly for those with a
history of currency devaluation or depreciation (Montiel 1994).
Calvo and Reinhart (2000a, b) argue that because of the credibility problem (in part
reflected in low credit ratings and high interest rate variability), exchange rate depreciation can
be particularly costly for developing countries.  Even a modest depreciation, for example, can
lead to a total loss of confidence, causing the country concerned to lose access to international
capital  markets  altogether,  whereas,  in  the  case  of  industrial  countries,  exchange  rate
expectations  may  be  more  regressive  (McKinnon  1999).  In  addition,  emerging  market
economies tend to be exposed to excessive exchange rate volatility and the relative thinness of
foreign exchange markets. 4 As a result, developing countries may face a much higher risk
As  experienced  in  the  European  Monetary  System  (EMS),  even  fixed  exchange  rates  are  not  immune  from
incurring  large risk premia  if credibility  is lacking.
The volatility  of  exchange  rates  that  is seemingly  unrelated  to fundamentals  has  led Jeanne  and Rose  (1999)  to
argue  that  the  "noise"  component  of  exchange  rate  volatility  depends  on  the  structure  of  the  foreign  exchange
market,  which  may  be  characterized  by multiple  equilibria  with  either  high  or  low  volatility.  In their  model,  the
entry of noise traders  in a market changes the structure  of risks and returns  in a way that makes  it more  attractive  for
other  noise  traders  to  join,  resulting  in  herd-like  behavior.  In this  environment,  it is  shown  that  the  monetary
authorities  can  reduce  exchange  rate volatility  induced  by the arrival  of noise traders,  for example,  by announcing  a5
premium under  flexible exchange rates.  It  is  possible that  developing countries find  this
consequence of exchange rate floating particularly unacceptable.  With a credible peg, on the
other hand, the risk premium can diminish, creating an environment more conducive to greater
investment in the tradables sector (Flood and Rose 1999; McKinnon 1999).
Given the threat of greater volatility, the fear of floating appears to be  related to the
vulnerability of certain countries to goods price fluctuations and their limited ability to hedge
exchange rate risk.  Hausmann, Panizza, and Stein (1999) have noted a correlation between the
degree of pass-through in tradable goods prices faced by a particular country and the size of its
international reserves (and its exchange rate volatility): high pass-through countries tend to hold
large international reserves, and impose some limits on exchange rate volatility.  Moreover, they
have also noted a correlation between the ability to borrow in one's own currency and the size of
its international reserves (and its exchange rate volatility): countries that have a greater ability to
borrow in their own currencies tend to hold smaller international reserves and have greater
exchange rate volatility.
The fact  that  most  emerging market economies cannot borrow easily  in  their  own
currencies but tend to rely on foreign-currency borrowing, offers reasons for their preference
toward exchange rate stability and large international reserves. 5 This reflects the fact that, with
the limited ability to  borrow in their  own currencies, they cannot fully hedge their foreign
currency positions, inasmuch as there is an excess supply of foreign currency-denominated debt
relative to  domestic currency-denominated debt at the national level, limiting the scope for
currency swaps (see also Fernandez-Arias and Hausmann 1999; Eichengreen and Hausmann
1999).  Worse still, as the risk premium (hence the cost of hedging) increases with volatility,
putting upward pressure on the domestic interest rates, there would be a greater temptation to
borrow abroad unhedged even if it were possible to hedge (McKinnon 1999). Thus, contrary to
the popular view, floating exchange rates may not create greater incentives for economic agents
to hedge their foreign exposure and minimize their vulnerability to large currency fluctuations
(Eichengreen 1999b).  With currency mismatches that necessarily arise from the lack of risk
hedging, moreover, currency depreciation would create balance sheet problems (Fernandez-Arias
and Hausmann 1999).
3. Effects of Exchange Rate Floating
Possibly in part owing to their greater vulnerability to external shocks and more limited
ability to hedge exchange rate risk, exchange rate volatility seems to exert greater real effects on
target zone.  In other words, the very act of floating creates additional volatility (see also Flood and Rose 1999).
This argument, applicable to any foreign exchange market, must apply with greater force to the foreign exchange
markets of emerging market economies because of their relative thinness.  In the context of Korea, Park, Wang and
Chung (1999) explain the unwillingness of the Korean monetary authorities to allow the currency to float freely by
the thinness of the foreign exchange market whose daily turnover amounted to only 1.6 percent of total exports and
imports in 1998 (in contrast, daily turnover was over 20 percent of total exports and imports in the United States,
Hong Kong SAR and Japan, over 100 percent in the United Kingdom, and over 60 percent in Singapore).
'  Hausmann, Panizza, and Stein (1999) measure the ability to borrow in one's  own currency by the ratio of all
foreign securities issued in a particular currency (e.g., won) to foreign securities issues by the country (e.g., Korea).
It turns out that, except for South Africa and Poland, developing countries do not generally issue foreign debt in
their own currencies.6
developing countries than industrial countries. For the industrial countries, it is well known that
the extensive literature  on the  impact of  exchange rate volatility on  trade is  inconclusive,
possibly because of its likely small impact (for a survey of the literature, see McKenzie 1999).
Recent research does show that the impact of exchange rate volatility on trade is negative but
small. Dell'Ariccia (1998), for example, shows in a gravity model (in which the volume of trade
between two countries increases with the product of GDPs and decreases with distance) that
exchange rate volatility has a negative, though small, effect on bilateral trade flows among 14
member countries of the European Union during the period 1975-94 (see also Gagnon 1993).
All in all, at least for industrial countries, exchange rate volatility is not usually considered to
have a negative impact on trade.
For developing countries, however, the negative effect of exchange rate volatility on
trade appears to be more pronounced, although the scope of existing empirical work is somewhat
limited (Calvo and  Reinhart 2000a; McKenzie 1999).  For example, Kumar and  Dhawan's
(1991) work on Pakistan's  exports to  Germany, Japan, and  the United States for  1974-85
suggests that exports were significantly adversely affected by variability in nominal bilateral
exchange rates.  Looking at the effect of real exchange rate variability on the exports of Chile,
Colombia, Peru,  the  Philippines, Thailand and  Turkey, Caballero and  Corbo  (1989)  have
obtained the clear evidence of generally significantly negative and substantial impact.  Arize,
Osang and Slottje (2000) have used quarterly data for 13 emerging market economies (including
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan Province of China [POC], and Thailand)
during  1973-96 to  confirm the significantly negative effect of  real effective exchange  rate
volatility  on exports.  In  addition, Calvo and  Reinhart (2000a) and  McKenzie (1999) cite
additional studies that indicate the evidence of significantly negative effects of exchange rate
volatility on trade, including the imports of some member countries of the Association of South
East Asian Nations (ASEAN).  Further systematic research is needed to  clearly establish the
negative impact of exchange rate volatility on trade in developing countries.
Exchange rate volatility may have a greater negative impact on domestic investment,
because its  longer-term orientation can magnify the  effect  of  uncertainty. 6 This  may  be
particularly true in the case of East Asian countries where much of foreign direct investment
(FDI) is directed towards manufacturing (re-)exports as opposed to  domestic sales. 7 Given
uncertainty, firms may find it optimal to wait rather than to commit themselves to a decision in
one way or another.  Waiting thus becomes an alternative to investing or not investing.  In this
environment, Dixit and Pindyck (1994) argued that the net present value (NPV) rule should be
modified to include the cost of waiting, such that the NPV of a project is given by the PV of
expected returns less the value of the option to invest later.  By incorporating exchange rate
uncertainty to the Dixit-Pindyck model, Darby, Hallett, Ireland and Piscitelli (1999) have shown
that there is a threshold level of exchange rate uncertainty beyond which investment is adversely
6On  the other hand, to the extent that purchasing power parity is more likely to hold in the long run, uncertainty
associated with exchange rate volatility may have a smaller role to play in investment decisions.
7  If FDI is directed towards domestic sales, greater exchange rate uncertainty may cause local production to replace
exports to that market, thus increasing FDI flows.  If FDI is directed towards (re)exports, exchange rate uncertainty
increases the riskiness of that particular host country as a production base.  See Ito, Isard, Symansky and Bayoumi
(1996) and Benassy-Quere,  Fontagne and Lahreche-Revil  (1999), as discussed below.7
affected.8 In a related vein, noting the inability of most developing countries to borrow in their
own currencies and thus the limited ability to hedge foreign exchange risk, Femandez-Arias and
Hausmann (1999) have argued that, with floating exchange rates, countries will reduce unhedged
foreign currency borrowing by simply reducing the total amount of foreign currency borrowing,
thereby experiencing less investment and growth.
Addressing the need to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) as a stable source of long-
term  capital,  Benassy-Quere, Fontagne and  Lahreche-Revil (1999) analyzed the  locational
decisions of a risk averse multinational firm, considering two foreign locations in order to re-
export (hence, trade and FDI are assumed to be complements).  In this model (in which two
developing countries are competing for FDI inflows), it is shown that exchange rate volatility is
detrimental to FDI because it increases the variance of local costs (hence profits measured in the
investing country's currency), thus diverting FDI to the other country with a smaller variance;
this prediction is empirically confirmed by a panel of 42 developing countries receiving FDI
from  17 OECD countries during  1984-96.  In  particular, while the  real  depreciation of a
developing country currency against that of the investing country is shown to  increase FDI
inflows (through what they call the competitiveness effect), an increase in nominal exchange rate
volatility reduces FDI inflows, controlled for distance and other country characteristics.  As a
policy implication, the importance of stabilizing the exchange rate against the currency of one's
most important FDI supplier needs to be underlined. 9
Finally, regarding the effect of exchange rate volatility on inflation and economic growth,
Ghosh, Gulde, Ostry and Wolf (1997) investigated a data set covering 140 countries over 1960-
90 by considering the degrees of exchange rate flexibility measured effectively in terms of
officially stated classification.  For both the entire sample and for the sample of developing
countries, 1I  they find unambiguously that inflation is both lower and less variable under pegged
regimes. Likewise, domestic investment is somewhat higher under pegged regimes.  The results
for growth, however, do not look so conclusive. For the entire sample as well as for the sample
of developing countries, growth does vary very little between floating and  pegged regimes,
Theoretically, investment can rise or fall with greater exchange rate uncertainty.  The types of industries more
likely to benefit from exchange rate uncertainty are those with few alternative uses and little scrap value or with
large entry costs. In contrast, the types of industries  whose investment  is likely to benefit from greater exchange rate
stability are those with high scrap value but a low opportunity cost of waiting. Based on the estimation of aggregate
investment equations for France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States, Darby, Hallett, Ireland
and Piscitelli (1999) have found significant,  negative coefficients  for exchange rate volatility.
) In this connection, a recent study by Nakamura and Oyama (1998) provides an interesting insight into how the
exchange rate sensitivity of FDI flows can be affected by the type of activities supported by FDI.  Using the sample
of eight East Asian economies (China, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan POC, and
Thailand), Nakamura and Oyama (1998) have noted that Japanese FDI into these countries during 1979-97 was
highly sensitive to changes in the real bilateral exchange rates, such that depreciation against the yen significantly
increased FDI from Japan.  The exchange rate sensitivity, however, was smaller for local market-oriented FDI
inflows.  On the other hand, no such strong exchange rate sensitivity was observed for American FDI into the
region.  For some countries, when the local currency depreciated against the US dollar, there was even a fall in FDI
from the United States, suggesting that much of American FDI was in real estate and other non-manufacturing
sectors where it assumed much of the character of portfolio investment. All in all, exchange rate sensitivity was the
most distinguishing  feature of Japanese FDI into East Asia.
1"  Separate statistics are reported for high and low per capita income countries.  Here, we refer to the results for the
low per capita income countries (which do not include industrial countries) as characterizing  "developing countries."8
prompting the authors to conclude that a nominal exchange rate regime matters little for real
output.
When attention is given only to the "high growth" sample, however, a different picture
emerges: while the average growth rate under pegged regimes (3.6 percent) may differ very little
from  the average  rate under  floating regimes (3.2  percent), the number of  "high  growth"
observations under pegged regimes (318) far exceeds the corresponding number under floating
regimes (149).  Of  course, this is by no means a  statistically rigorous test of the effect of
exchange rate regimes on growth. However, even allowing for the fact that the pegged exchange
rate observations were concentrated in the high-growth 1960s,  this result, though impressionistic,
seems to substantiate the claim of McKinnon (1999) that pegged exchange rates supported the
"remarkably rapid economic growth" of East Asian countries "in the 1980s through 1996" (and
Japan in the 1950s and 1960s). Williamson (1999b) has also observed that, of the 33 instances
of countries experiencing an annual growth rate of more than 6 percent after 1980, all but Peru
(1995-97) had some type of pegged exchange rates, and concluded that floating exchange rates
were not conducive to the "sustained high rates of growth that were experienced by East Asia
before the crisis."
III.  CHARACTERISTICS  OF THE EAST ASIAN ECONOMIES
1. Application  of Optimal Currency Area Criteria
It  is self-evident that the design of an optimal exchange rate policy for East Asia is
largely determined by the individual  and collective characteristics  of the economies in the region.
In this context, several attempts have been made in the literature to assess the readiness of East
Asia for monetary union on the basis of the theory of optimal currency areas, which is purported
to evaluate the costs and benefits of fixing the exchange rate(s) for a particular country or a
group of countries in terms of some real characteristics.  The so-called optimal currency area
(OCA) criteria, which have been proposed to make that evaluation, include, among others, (1)
degree of factor mobility; (2) openness; (3) degree of commodity diversification; (4) price and
wage rigidity; and (5) degree of market integration (for a review of the literature, see Tavlas
1993). Most of these studies seem to suggest that East Asia is not any less ready to constitute a
single currency area than Western Europe was in the 1980s.
In one of the earliest such studies, Goto and Hamada (1994) analyzed an extensive set of
economic variables (such as money, interest rates, price levels, real GDP, investment, trade
intensity, trade dependence, labor mobility and FDI) to show that the degree of interdependence
among East Asian countries through trade and factor movements was substantial, with  some
indicators showing higher integration than in Europe.  In particular, they showed that, in 1990,
bilateral trade  linkage in East Asia was extremely high on the basis of the  index of  trade
intensity, defined as follows.
Ij,k =  (Tj,k/Tj)/(Tk/T,)  (1)9
where Ij,k is the index of trade intensity between country j  and county k, Tj,k is the volume of
country  j's  trade with country k, Tj is the total volume of country  j's  trade, Tk is the total volume
of country k's trade, and T,  is the volume of total world trade.  In other words, the index of trade
intensity measures the closeness of bilateral trade linkage, adjusted for relative volume in world
trade. Note that Ij,k is defined symmetrically, such that Ij,k = lkj.  It was found that intensity was
extremely high in  many trading pairs  in East Asia, frequently exceeding the corresponding
figures in European pairs.  Japan's trade intensity with East Asian partners was also high (even
higher than Germany's intensity with many of its European partners), indicating the pivotal role
of Japan in East Asian trade.
When we update the data for 1995, we find that what Goto and Hamada (1994) observed
in  1990 remained essentially unchanged (Tables la and  lb).  According to Table  la, which
updates and extends their results for East Asia in 1995, we find that a number of pairs (e.g.,
Laos-Cambodia, Thailand-Cambodia, Vietnam-Cambodia, China-Hong Kong SAR, Thailand-
Laos, and Vietnam-Laos) had particularly intense trade links, with intensity indices exceeding
five for as many as thirteen pairs.  In Western Europe (Table lb),  in contrast, only four pairs
(Sweden-Denmark,  Finland-Sweden,  UK-Ireland and Portugal-Spain) had trade intensity indices
exceeding five.  It is interesting to note that Japan-Korea had a more intense trade link than did
France-Germany or the Netherlands-Germany. The pivotal position of Japan in East Asian trade
in 1995 appeared more significant than that of Germany or France in Western European trade.
In terms of trade intensity, therefore, East Asia is a highly integrated region, no less ready for a
regional currency arrangement than Western Europe.
In openness and size, too, many of the East Asian countries would seem to benefit from a
common currency arrangement.  For example, the value of exports and imports in the principal
trading countries of East Asia either approaches  or exceeds 100 percent of GDP, with the notable
exceptions of China and Japan (Table 2).  For one thing, small open economies would benefit
from stable exchange rates as a way of ensuring domestic price stability.  For another, the
relatively large size of the external sector associated with  openness would mean that  stable
exchange rates provide considerable savings in transactions cost.  Eichengreen and Bayoumi
(1999) argue that such savings would be particularly significant for some East Asian country
pairs with intense trade linkages.
Operationalizing the  OCA theory, Eichengreen and  Bayoumi (1999) have regressed
bilateral exchange rate volatility on four OCA criteria (i.e., relative output variability as a proxy
for asymmetric output disturbances, dissimilarity of export composition, strength of bilateral
trade, and economic size) for 1976-95, and found that more stable exchange rates were observed
for countries that trade more heavily, countries that are small, countries whose GDPs fluctuate
together, and countries with a more similar composition of exports.  Based on this model, they
have further shown that the simulated levels of exchange rate variability for Singapore-Malaysia,
Singapore-Thailand, Singapore-Taiwan POC, Hong Kong SAR-Taiwan POC, and Singapore-
Hong Kong SAR would approach Western European levels.  In terms  of preparedness for
monetary union, East Asia in 1995 was not very far from continental Europe in 1987 (Bayoumi,
Eichengreen and Mauro 2000).
Benassy-Quere (1999) has used the sample of 40 countries (including 9 in  Asia) for
1986-95 to regress the volatility of their bilateral exchange rates with respect to the Japanese yen,10
the US dollar and the deutsche mark on three OCA criteria (i.e., relative output variability,
similarity of export structure, and strength of bilateral trade), and found that the OCA criteria
explained the degree of bilateral exchange rate stability reasonably well.  In other words, it was
generally found that the first coefficient was positive, and the second and third coefficients were
negative, suggesting that asymmetric shocks give incentives for exchange rate flexibility while
trade integration leads to more stability.  It should also be noted that while OCA theory may
explain the degree of exchange rate volatility among East Asian economies, it does not explain
their pegging behavior vis-A-vis  the major international currencies, notably the high degree of
nominal stability against the US dollar.  It is possible that the "excess" stability of East Asian
currencies against the US dollar (beyond what can be explained by OCA theory on the basis of
bilateral linkage) is accounted for by the importance of trade linkage with other countries in the
US dollar bloc (Kawai and Akiyama 2000).
While, all  in  all, the  economies of East Asia appear to  be plausible  candidates for
internationally harmonized monetary policies on  standard OCA  grounds, no  less  than the
members of the European Union, attention has recently been directed to the self-evident fact that
some of the celebrated OCA criteria are endogenous. In other words, it is likely that the very act
of forning  monetary union contributes to the fostering of an optimal currency area, thereby
strengthening international trade linkages and the correlation of business cycles.'1 Indeed, the
indices measuring the degree of simulated exchange rate volatility (based on OCA theory) of
major Western European countries are shown to  have declined rapidly from  1987 to  1995
(Bayoumi, Eichengreen and Mauro 2000).  What this means in the context of East Asia is that
the OCA criteria by themselves do not provide the overriding basis for determining the type of
exchange rate arrangement to be chosen, although they may be useful for giving a quantitative
sense of the reasonableness of one type of exchange rate regime or another in  a  particular
situation.
2. Integration through Trade and FDI
In terms of trade shares, East Asia is almost equally connected with Japan, the United
States and the European Union (Table 3). During 1990-98, for exports, the United States was by
far the most important market for principal Asian exporters, such as Malaysia, the Philippines,
Singapore, Thailand, Hong Kong, Korea and Taiwan, although Japan was more important for
Vietnam, China and the resource exporting countries of Brunei and Indonesia.  For imports,
Japan was the most important source country, except in Brunei (for which the European Union
was the most important).  For total trade (exports plus imports), Japan was the largest trading
partner for Indonesia (26 percent), Thailand (23 percent), Malaysia (19 percent) and China (18
"  It should be noted that, theoretically, closer trade ties could result in either tighter or looser correlation of national
business cycles.  Cycles could become more idiosyncratic,  if countries  become more specialized. On the other hand,
if demand shocks are dominant, or there are more common (supply and/or demand) shocks, or intra-industry trade
accounts for most trade, cycles may become more similar.  Concentrating  their attention on the relationship between
trade links and business cycle correlation, Frankel  and Rose (1998) analyzed  the panel data of 21 industrial countries
over 30 years to obtain a strong positive relationship, i.e., closer international trade links result in more closely
correlated business cycles across countries. This result is robust with respect to the choice of a particular measure of
bilateral trade intensity (e.g., imports, exports or total of imports and exports) or bilateral real activity correlation
(e.g. GDP, industrial production, or employment).11
percent), while the United States was the largest trading partner for the Philippines (26 percent),
Taiwan POC (24 percent), Korea (22 percent), Singapore (18 percent) and Hong Kong SAR (15
percent).  The EU was the largest partner for Cambodia (12 percent) and the second largest for
Indonesia and Thailand (17 percent each). This geographical  diversification of trade should be a
reason against a single currency peg, be it to the US dollar, the Japanese yen, or the euro.
Another characteristic of East Asia (including Japan) is its high share of intra-regional
trade, which was 45 percent in exports, 49 percent in imports,  and 47 percent in total trade during
1990-98; excluding Japan, the corresponding figures were 37, 35 and 36 percent (Table 3)12  In
other words, about a half of international  trade in East Asia is conducted within the region itself,
including Japan. Bayoumi, Eichengreen and Mauro (1999) state that this degree of intra-regional
trade in East Asia is similar to the euro area and that intra-regional trade as a share of regional
GDP is even higher than for the countries participating in MERCOSUR or NAFTA.  Moreover,
for exports, the composition of trade in East Asia is heavily weighted toward manufactures,
accounting for four-fifths of total exports; the share of manufactures in imports is generally
lower but of the same order of magnitude (Table 4).  For example, in 1997, except for Indonesia,
the share of manufactures in the exports of principal exporting countries in East Asia ranged
between 71 percent for Thailand and 96 percent for Taiwan POC.  On average, moreover, five of
each country's closest competitors come from its East Asian neighbors. In terms of similarity of
trade structure, East Asia is thus almost like Europe, and it may have come to the point where it
can benefit from some coordination of exchange rate policies (Williamson 1999a).
Finally, the regional breakdown of FDI inflows into East Asia may be noted (Table 5).
For 14 countries of East Asia (excluding Japan), about 11 percent of total FDI inflows during
1990-98 came from Japan, about 10 percent from the United States and about 9 percent from
Europe. Over 40 percent, however, is accounted for by intra-regional sources, reflecting the fact
that over 60 percent of the $540 billion inflows into China came from Hong Kong. For ASEAN
only, almost 20 percent of the inflows came from Japan, while about 12 percent and over 13
percent came from the US and Europe, respectively.  The presence of FDI from the US and
Europe is much more significant in Korea, whereas Japanese FDI constitutes the largest segment
in Taiwan. All in all, Japan, the US and the EU are equally important foreign direct investors in
East Asia, with Japan being the most significant in ASEAN.
3. Nature of Economic Shocks and the Speed of Adjustment
Using the structural vector autoregression (VAR) approach, Eichengreen and Bayoumi
(1999) have shown that the size of aggregate demand shocks was twice as large in Europe as in
Asia over 1972-89, while that of aggregate supply shocks was about the same.  Noting that the
correlation of supply shocks was more informative for policy purposes,' 3 they found two groups
of Asian countries among which aggregate supply shocks were significantly correlated, namely,
12  The corresponding figures for ASEAN only were 22, 18 and 20 percent, respectively. On this basis, East Asia is a
far more self-contained  area than ASEAN.
1  The demand shocks can be highly sensitive to the choice of  exchange rate arrangement and macroeconomic
policy.  For example, Eichengreen and Bayoumi (1999) showed that the demand shocks of Hong Kong SAR,
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand were highly correlated with one another, suggesting the countries'
dollar peg policy.12
(1) Japan,  Korea  and  Taiwan  (which  compete  with each other  in the  US market);  and  (2)  Hong
Kong,  Indonesia,  Malaysia  and  Singapore  (see also  Bayoumi  and  Eichengreen  1994).  In terms
of  demand  shocks  as  well,  most  of the  ASEAN  countries  seem  to  satisfy  the  symmetrical-
disturbance  criterion just  as well as Europe, meaning  that the benefit of an independent  monetary
policy  made  possible  by  exchange  rate  flexibility  is  limited  against  intra-regional  shocks
(Bayoumi,  Eichengreen  and Mauro  1999; also Bayoumi  and Eichengreen  1994).
Eichengreen  and Bayoumi  (1999) have noted that labor markets  are more flexible  in East
Asia  than  in  Europe;  Goto  and  Hamada  (1994)  present  some  evidence  to  show  that  labor
mobility  may  also be  higher.  Perhaps,  reflecting the  more  flexible  labor  markets,  the  speed  of
adjustment  to a shock  is shown to be much faster in Asia, indicating  that the cost of permanently
fixing the  exchange  rate (and  foregoing  policy  autonomy)  is lower.  In East  Asia,  almost  all of
the change in output  and prices in response  to a shock takes  place in the first two years,  whereas
at most  half of the change  occurs  in the  first two  years in Europe,  with  the rest  requiring  much
longer (see also Bayoumi  and Eichengreen  1994).
On  the  basis  of  a  similar  line  of  analysis,  Bayoumi  and  Eichengreen  (1994)  also
compared  Asia  to  other  regions  of the  world,  and  concluded  that  Northern  Europe,  Northeast
Asia (Japan,  Korea,  Taiwan),  and Southeast  Asia (Hong Kong,  Indonesia,  Malaysia,  Singapore,
and  possibly  Thailand)  were  plausible  candidates  for  monetary  union,  but not  North  or South
America.  Each  of the three  regions  consisted  of economies  with relatively  small  disturbances,
high  correlations  across  economies,  and  rapid  speeds  of  adjustment.  Conditions  are  more
conducive  to monetary  unification  in East Asia than  in the Americas.  In particular,  ASEAN  is a
more  logical  candidate  for  a regional  currency  than  either  NAFTA  or MERCOSUR  (Bayoumi
and Mauro  1999).
4. Greater Diversity in Levels of Economic and Financial Development
Against  these positive  scores, it should be noted that East Asia is characterized  by greater
diversity  in terms  of size,  the level of economic  development,  industrial  structures,  the depth  of
financial  markets,  and  broad  institutional  frameworks  than  Europe  (Table  6).  At  one  extreme,
Hong  Kong  SAR  and  Singapore  are  city-states,  with  small  populations,  industrial  and  service
sectors,  and  high  per  capital  incomes.  Korea  and  Taiwan  POC  are  relatively  large,  highly
competitive  industrial  powers.  At  the  other,  China  and  the  recent  ASEAN  members,  i.e.,
Cambodia,  Laos,  Myanmar,  and  Vietnam,  are  relatively  populous,  agricultural  and  poor
economies  with  limited mobility  of capital.  Brunei  Darussalam,  Indonesia  and  Malaysia  are oil
exporters,  while  most  other  countries  are  oil  importers.  In  addition,  China  and  Vietnam  are
transition  economies  still  dominated  by  state-owned  enterprises  and  banks.  In the  middle,  in
terms of per capita income levels, are Malaysia, Thailand,  the Philippines,  and Indonesia.
This  diversity  in East Asia makes the task  of monetary  cooperation,  let alone  a common
central  bank,  more  difficult.  To the  extent  that  financial  shocks  are an  increasingly  prevalent
source of asymmetric  shocks, asymmetry  in financial development  may be an argument  against a
common  peg,  much  less  a common  currency,  in  East  Asia  (Eichengreen  and  Bayoumi  1999).
VAR  analysis,  however,  shows less conclusive  results  about  the comparison  of the response  of13
economic  variables  to  an  interest  rate  shock  between East  Asia  and  Europe  (Bayoumi,
Eichengreen and Mauro 2000).
IV.  THE IMPACT OF FLUCTUATIONS  OF MAJOR CURRENCY  EXCHANGE
RATES ON THE EAST ASIAN ECONOMIES
1. Structural VAR Model of the East Asian Economies
It is useful to have some quantitative assessment of how an East Asian economy might
respond to  a  change in  its  real  effective exchange rate.  Such  an assessment  is useful  in
considering an optimal exchange rate policy for East Asia, because a high sensitivity of income,
prices and other macroeconomic variables to a change in the real effective exchange rate would
mean the desirability of a policy of stabilizing the real effective exchange rate.  On the other
hand, if it turns out that the macroeconomic variables are insensitive to a change in the real
effective exchange rate, exchange rate policy can be conducted without giving too much regard
to stabilizing the real effective exchange rate, at least for the purpose of macroeconomic  stability.
Here, for simplicity, the real effective exchange rate is assumed to be common across
East Asia and is defined as a weighted average of the bilateral real exchange rate against the US
dollar (with the weight of 0.4), the Japanese yen (0.3) and the European Currency Unit (0.3), a
precursor of the euro introduced in January 1999.  This set of weights was chosen to represent
the broad geographical composition of trade and FDI in East Asia, with the weight of the dollar
increased slightly to reflect its greater financial importance and the presence of large dollar bloc
countries outside of the United States. Our experiments have shown that the results presented in
this  section will not change substantially with an alternative weighting scheme of 0.5 for the
dollar, 0.3 for the yen and 0.2 for the ECU, or with the choice of the synthetic euro (instead of
the ECU).  14 To the extent that many of the East Asian countries had maintained stable exchange
rates against the US dollar during the period up to the currency crisis of  1997, most of the
changes in the real effective exchange rate so defined in reality amounted to  exchange rate
fluctuations between the US dollar and the other major currencies, such as the Japanese yen.
For  an  East  Asian  economy,  we  consider  the  following  moving  average  (MA)
representation of a structural vector autoregression  (VAR) model,
AlnYt = ZQlj  utj  + Ed2j  vtj  +  Y-,3 i Wt-j  +  104Xt-j  (2)
AlnEt  = Ek 1j ut.j + YP2jvtj  +  Ek3jwtj  +  Ek4jxtj  (3)
AlnPt =  Zn jutj  +±  r2jvtj  +  XFl3jwtj + EXl4jxtj  (4)
14 Prior to 1975,  the ECU rate was calculated by assuming the initial ECU composition. The synthetic euro was also
tried instead of the ECU without much difference in results. The value of the synthetic euro was calculated  by taking
the weighted average of the currencies of all EU member countries, with the weights given by nominal GDP shares
in 1990.14
where AlnYt, AlnEt  and AlnPt are, respectively, the growth rate of relative real GDP, the rate of
change in the real effective exchange rate, and the rate of relative inflation (measured in terms of
GDP deflators); xt is an unspecified set of exogenous variables affecting the VAR system; and u,
v and w are, respectively, macroeconomic fundamental shocks to  relative real GDP, the real
effective exchange rate and relative inflation. Here, relative real GDP is defined as the country's
real GDP relative to real world GDP and the rate of relative inflation is defined as the rate of
change in the country's  GDP deflator relative to the world GDP deflator, where the relevant
world variables are given by the weighted average of the US (with the weight of 0.4), Japanese
(0.3) and EU (0.3) variables; the EU variables are in turn given by the weighted averages of the
relevant variables for its members, with the GDP shares in 1990.  The real effective exchange
rate is defined as the country's weighted exchange rates vis-a-vis the US dollar (with the weight
of 0.4), the Japanese yen (0.3) and the ECU (0.3), using GDP deflators as the price variables.
Following the procedures suggested by Blanchard and Quah (1989) and Clarida and Gali
(1994), we identify the underlying shocks by estimating the structural VAR model, which can be
obtained by converting the above MA processes, under the restrictions that the sums of the
coefficients  *2j,  +3j and  X3j  are respectively zero, that is,  Z4 2j =0,  Z43j=0  and  ZX 3j=0.  These
restrictions reflect the conditions that (a) the real output shock ut affects all the variables in the
long run; (b) the real exchange rate shock vt affects both the real exchange rate  and price
inflation, but not real output, in the long run; and (c) the nominal shock wt affects only the rate of
inflation in the long run (Clarida and Gali 1994). In view of the preliminary information based
on AIC and other criteria (Kawai and Okumura 1996), lag length is set at one.  For xt, we use the
real oil prices, which are given by the US dollar prices of oil adjusted for the US producer price
index. Data frequency is annual and the sample period is 1970-98  (1979-98 for China).
2. Impulse Response Analyses
The above model can be used to analyze the patterns of impulse response of relative real
GDP growth (simply real GDP hereafter) and relative price inflation (simply the price hereafter)
when there is a shock in the rate of change in real effective exchange rates (simply the real
effective exchange rate hereafter). In what follows, we will use the impulse responses of the two
key macroeconomic variables as a way of assessing the impact of fluctuations in major currency
exchange rates on the  East Asian economies, namely, China, Hong Kong SAR,  Indonesia,
Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan POC and Thailand.
Panels in Figure 2 depict, for the respective economies, the impulse responses of real
GDP and the price to a one-standard deviation shock to the real effective exchange rate; they also
show how the real effective exchange rate itself will respond over time.  It appears that the initial
responses of real GDP and prices are asymmetric between the crisis and non-crisis countries.
First, in response to a unit depreciation of the real effective exchange rate, real GDP initially
increases in the non-crisis countries, namely, China, Hong Kong SAR, Singapore and Taiwan
POC.  In contrast, real GDP initially declines in most of the crisis countries, namely, Indonesia,
Korea, the Philippines and Thailand; in Malaysia, output remains virtually unchanged.  These
asymmetric responses between the crisis and non-crisis countries may reflect the impact of the
currency crisis of  1997-98, where a sharp fall in output was associated with a sharp currency
depreciation.15
In  fact, it turns  out  that  the negative (or virtually nil) response of  real GDP  to  a
depreciation of the real effective exchange rate disappears in almost all crisis countries if only
the pre-1997 sample is considered. In the pre-crisis sample of 1970-96 (1979-96 for China), the
response of real GDP to a real effective depreciation is positive except in the Philippines.  In the
case of the Philippines, real GDP tended to react negatively in response to depreciation of real
effective exchange rates regardless of whether  the 1997-98  crisis period is included in the sample
or not.  This result for the Philippines may be explained by its crisis experience in the 1980s
when the debt crisis was accompanied by political turmoil and large exchange rate depreciation.
Hence, we may conclude that, in general, real effective depreciation initially has an expansionary
impact on output in East Asia, except at the time of a crisis.  In about half of the cases, the
positive response of real GDP is followed by negative responses, which gradually diminish
overtime, and in another half of the cases, the positive response diminishes monotonically over
time.
Second, the initial response of the price level to a unit depreciation of the real effective
exchange rate is also positive in all the non-crisis countries (China, Hong Kong SAR, Singapore,
and Taiwan POC) and in Korea. In contrast, the response is negative in the majority of the crisis
countries, namely, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines; in Thailand the response is almost
nil. Again, when only the pre-1997 sample is considered, the response of prices to a depreciation
of the  real  effective exchange rate  becomes positive, except in  Malaysia.  In  the  case of
Malaysia, prices tended  to  react  negatively in  response to  a  depreciation of  real  effective
exchange rates, followed by positive movements which gradually diminish over time, regardless
of whether the 1997-98 crisis period is included in the sample or not.  In almost all cases, the
positive initial response of prices is followed by negative responses, which gradually diminish
over time; in Malaysia, the price movements are in the opposite direction.
3. Importance  of Real Effective  Exchange  Rate Stability
To have some indication of the quantitative importance of the impulse responses, we
have normalized the responses of real GDP, prices, and the real effective exchange rate by the
magnitude of a one standard deviation shock to each of the variables, respectively (Figure 4).
Note that the initial normalized response of the real effective exchange rate is always unity
because one standard deviation shock to the real exchange rate is considered to be the triggering
shock. We find that the output response is considerable in all countries: more than two standard
deviations for China and Indonesia, over one standard deviation for Taiwan POC and Thailand,
and about one standard deviation for other countries (for the crisis-affected countries, the figures
are from the pre-crisis sample).  The initial price response is also considerable, particularly for
the small open economies of Hong Kong SAR (over two standard deviations) and Singapore
(almost four standard deviations).
We conclude that, in all of the East Asian economies considered here, both real output
and prices respond considerably to a change in the real effective exchange rate, suggesting that
the policy framework that  stabilized the real effective exchange rate would be  important in
ensuring macroeconomic stability.16
V.  THE OBJECTIVES  OF EXCHANGE  RATE POLICY  IN EAST ASIA
Exchange rate policy may be assigned several specific objectives, such as maintenance of
balance in  payments equilibrium, stability of real  output, prices and  other macroeconomic
variables,  promotion  of  international trade  and  investment,  reduction  of  exchange  risk,
uncertainty, and transactions costs, and crisis prevention. Of these objectives, it appears that the
crisis prevention role of exchange rate policy has been almost exclusively  emphasized in some of
the recent literature, given the increasingly yet imperfectly globalizing environment for emerging
market economies.  Such an emphasis, though important, may not serve the best interests of
these countries in the long run, if it is focused on exclusively.  For one thing, even if crisis
prevention is a worthy goal, the policymakers should balance the benefit of crisis prevention
against the costs of potentially foregoing the achievement of other goals, such as trade and FDI
promotion and economic growth.  For another, given the  fact that the two  corner-solution
approach to exchange rate policy may not prevent crisis, by and of itself in the absence of other
credible macroeconomic  policy and prudential measures, it may not be wise to assign that task to
the exchange rate alone.  We believe that the dynamic East Asian economies can and should
continue  to  pursue  growth-oriented  policies  in  a  stable  macroeconomic  environment  by
promoting trade, FDI, other forms of capital inflows, investment, and growth, without exposing
themselves to the recurrence of a crisis.
I. Macroeconomic  Stabilization
For most practical purposes, exchange rate policy for small open economies may broadly
be considered to have a microeconomic or allocative role (e.g., maintaining international price
competitiveness or facilitating relative price adjustment) and a macroeconomic role (including
that of anchoring domestic prices).  At times, the microeconomic role and the macroeconomic
role can be conflicting, with one requiring exchange rate flexibility, while the other requiring
exchange rate stability.  The structural VAR analysis presented in the previous section clearly
indicates that real output and price inflation in all major East Asian countries are sensitive to
fluctuations in real effective exchange rates.  Thus, from the standpoint of minimizing domestic
output and price  fluctuations, it is  important that the  East Asian economies pay  sufficient
attention to maintaining stability of real effective exchange rates.  For this purpose, a peg to a
single currency (be it the US dollar, the yen or the euro) may not be a good option, because it
would inherently destabilize real effective exchange rates.
Maintaining stable macroeconomic  environments is one of the key components of sound
economic management. Given that the emerging market economies are subject to  numerous
types of shocks, such as sudden changes in terms of trade, foreign demand, and global interest
rates, exchange rate flexibility may be useful as a buffer against these shocks originating abroad.
In small open economies, however, exchange rate instability due to free floating can be a source
of additional shocks to prices and other macroeconomic variables, thus making macroeconomic
policy management difficult. Thus the potential benefits of floating as a shock absorber must be
weighed against  the  potential  costs  of  greater  difficulties in  macroeconomic management
associated with exchange rate instability.17
2. The Exchange Rate as a Nominal Anchor
Somewhat related to the question of macroeconomic stability is the nominal anchor role
of the exchange rate.  In this context, some authors have argued that the achievement of relative
price stability in much of East Asia has not necessarily relied on the use of the exchange rate as a
nominal anchor. Glick, Hutchson, and Moreno (1999), for example, noted that, in East Asia, the
economies whose currencies appreciated relatively less against the US dollar in nominal terms
tended to experience higher inflation, and argued that the exchange rate pegging policies did not
necessarily ensure price stability but rather created inflationary pressure.  According to their
interpretation,  the higher rate of inflation in East Asia can be explained by the fact that the policy
of nominal exchange rate stability against the US dollar forced the needed real exchange rate
appreciation to take place through price level adjustment (rather than nominal exchange rate
adjustment), given the presumed higher productivity growth relative to  the United States." 5
Glick, Hutchson, and Moreno then concluded that East Asia's low inflation was attributable not
necessarily to the policy of nominal exchange rate stability, but to  rapid economic growth,
limited budget deficits, the importance of the traded goods sector, and political stability.
This  consideration, however, should not minimize the contribution of stable nominal
exchange rates to the environment of overall macroeconomic stability (i.e., the rate of inflation
of about 7 percent in the 1980s, compared with 30 percent in developing countries as a whole).
The East Asian experience may well suggest that, even with a stable nominal exchange rate,
inflationary pressure could still emerge if productivity growth is sufficiently higher than in the
country of the anchor currency, and that some upward adjustment in the nominal exchange rate
may be desirable from time  to time.  Even so, the inflation performance of  East Asia was
impressive, and the broad nominal anchor role of the exchange rate probably should not be
underestimated even in East Asia.
3. Price Competitiveness, Orderly Resource Allocation, and Economic Development
Compared to the nominal anchor role of the exchange rate, the use of exchange rate
policy to promote price competitiveness, orderly resource allocation and economic development,
on the other hand, may be  more relevant in East Asia.  In a  broader context of developing
countries in general, it is sometimes stated that the microeconomic role of exchange rate policy
should be  emphasized because of  these countries' specific weaknesses, such as  balance of
payments constraints and vulnerability to external shocks.  Aghevli, Khan, and Montiel (1991),
for example, argued that exchange rate policy in developing countries should aim at protecting
international competitiveness by stabilizing the real effective exchange rate.  In some cases, the
microeconomic role of exchange rate policy may call for engineering relative price changes for
current account adjustment (Dornbusch and Park 1999), which would require some degree of
exchange rate flexibility.
15 The evidence of faster productivity growth in East Asia, however, has not been established, and even if it is, there
should be  no a priori theoretical relationship between productivity growth and real appreciation.  Over a much
longer time horizon, Ito, Isard, Symansky and Bayoumi (1996) note that the real exchange rates (measured in GDP
deflators) of fast-growing East Asia did not necessarily experience appreciation.  For instance, the real exchange
rates  of  Hong  Kong  SAR,  Singapore and  Thailand remained fairly constant, while  Indonesia and  Malaysia
experienced a moderate real depreciation.18
Flexible exchange rates, however, can be a double-edged sword.  While exchange rate
flexibility can be a tool of relative price adjustment, the system of floating exchange rates has
often  led  to  the  emergence  of  large  currency  misalignment,  i.e.,  a  sustained  period  of
overvaluation or undervaluation.  Williamson (1999b) has argued that, in  terms of limiting
currency misalignment, the system of floating exchange rates is the worst possible regime, with
the most resilient arrangement being a crawling band, followed by managed floating, and fixed
rates.  He then explains the difference in economic performance between India (good) and New
Zealand (bad) following economic liberalization by the fact that India managed the exchange
rate with an objective of maintaining international price competitiveness, while New Zealand
made no attempt to  contain the upward float of the exchange rate.  On this  score, an easy
recourse to exchange rate flexibility, intended to engineer a real depreciation or undervaluation,
may not be a sustainable means of promoting international  price competitiveness. In this respect,
ensuring exchange rate stability can be a more sensible way of maintaining price competitiveness
over the medium term, provided that a stable macroeconomic  environment is preserved.
Maintaining international price competitiveness through exchange rate stability has  a
particularly important dimension in a highly integrated region such as East Asia, where countries
not only trade but also compete with each other in third markets and in attracting FDI to enhance
export competitiveness. In such an environment, an attempt by one country to undercut another
by depreciating its currency, for example, will result in a large reallocation of resources across
countries, which may not be justified by long-run equilibrium considerations.  In this respect,
too, the system of floating exchange rates with a propensity towards short-term volatility and/or
medium-term misalignment may be a costly arrangement for East Asia.  It may thus be desirable
to have some mechanism of avoiding beggar-thy neighbor exchange rate policies and ensuring
intra-regional exchange rate stability.  Such a  mechanism is beneficial not only in  avoiding
wasteful exchange rate-induced resource reallocation but also in promoting capital inflows into
the region and, hence, physical and human capital investment and economic growth throughout
the region (Collignon 1999).
4. Intra-Regional  Exchange  Rate Stability
With this background, it may be useful to assess the actual exchange rate policies of East
Asian countries, in  which the US dollar has played the role of an anchor currency with a
predominant weight (see, for example, Takagi 1999). While this overwhelming share of the US
dollar is inexplicable in terms of trade share, much less debt denomination (Benassy-Quere
1999), several authors have noted that the de facto  dollar peg policy has helped promote intra-
regional exchange rate stability, an important policy objective for a highly integrated region such
as East Asia (Bayoumi, Eichengreen and Mauro 1999; McKinnon 1999).  Given the excessive
weight of the US dollar, however, fluctuations in the dollar/yen rate has caused boom and bust
cycles in East Asian countries, in part contributing to the currency crisis (Ito, Ogawa and Sasaki
1998; Ogawa,  Ito,  and  Sasaki 1999) and  leading McKinnon (1999) to  call  the yen/dollar
exchange rate the "loose cannon in the pre-1997 East-Asian exchange rate regime."  Against the
benefit of intra-regional exchange rate stability and the cost of yen/dollar rate-induced effective
exchange  rate  fluctuation,  Williamson  (1999a)  has  characterized  this  de  facto  regional
arrangement as a classic collective action problem, whereby each country is compelled to stay19
close to  the  dollar because it  fears that  appreciation against the dollar  would weaken its
competitiveness against its regional competitors.' 6
An interesting consequence of East Asia's de facto dollar peg policy has been suggested
by Collignon (1999), namely, the possibility that fluctuations of the dollar/yen rate would be
magnified.  In his model of "bloc floating" (in which the exchange rates vis-a-vis currencies
within the bloc are stable, while the exchange rates vis-a-vis out-of-bloc currencies remain
volatile), he shows that as the relative size of a particular currency bloc increases in the world, so
is the degree of volatility in the exchange rate between blocs as the only instrument of current
account adjustment.  As the currency bloc increases in size, exchange rates have to adjust in
response to  changes in fundamental variables, creating a tradeoff between greater intra-bloc
exchange rate stability and higher exchange rate instability across currency blocs. With greater
exchange rate volatility, the trade and FDI links with countries outside the bloc declines, while
intra-bloc exchange rate stability promotes trade and FDI within the bloc.  In the context of East
Asia, this view suggests that as more and more countries began to peg their currencies effectively
to the US dollar, the dollar/yen exchange rate became more volatile, and East Asia's trade and
FDI  share  of the  United States rose at the  expense of  Japan, a  phenomenon not  entirely
inconsistent with the gradual decline of Japan actually observed in East Asian trade over the
recent decade.'7
VI. A REGIONAL CURRENCY BASKET SYSTEM: OPERATIONAL  ISSUES
1. The Benefit of a Regional Exchange Rate Arrangement
A  regional  framework of  exchange rate  stabilization could  conceivably  allow  the
countries to retain the benefit (i.e., intra-regional stability) of the de facto  dollar peg policy
without the associated cost of effective exchange rate instability.  East Asian economies would
particularly benefit from such action because of their openness, their high share of intra-regional
trade,  and  their  increasing  importance of  manufactures in  trade  structure.  As  they  are
increasingly becoming competitors to  each other, exchange rate policies that do not  closely
follow the sarne pattern will have a major impact on relative competitiveness (Dornbusch and
Park 1999).
For this reason, Williamson (1999a) has suggested the adoption of a common basket peg,
which ensures intra-regional stability while allowing some flexibility against the dollar, the yen
and the euro (see also Bayoumi, Eichengreen and Mauro 1999).  The collective choice of a
common basket for East Asia helps  avoid the possibility that  changes in industrial country
exchange rates would  destablize effective exchange rates,  as would be the  case when each
currency were pegged to the US dollar.  According to his experiment with a common basket
(consisting of the US dollar, the yen and the euro) for nine East Asian economies (i.e., China,
Hong Kong SAR, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan POC, and
16 See Ohno and Shirono (1997) for an early statement of the collective action approach to the de facto  dollar peg in
East Asia.
"  Continuing this line of argument, Collignon (1999) states that the emergence of a European currency bloc has
made exchange rates between the  three major  world currencies more volatile  and thereby  contributed to the
reduction of cross-border investment worldwide.20
Thailand), given the geographical distribution and industrial structure of trade that are broadly
similar across countries; it is shown that a common basket would have been far better for all
countries than the actual exchange rate policies taken.  A common basket would give results
"surprisingly close"  to  those of  individual currency baskets in  terms of  stabilizing the real
effective exchange rates for almost all countries.
Once  again  in  Collignon's  (1999) model  of  bloc  floating, a  regional  approach to
exchange rate stability may also have the benefit of reducing the volatility of major industrial
country exchange rates, in addition to that of coping with volatile exchange rates among the
major currencies. As the number of countries whose currencies are pegged to the US dollar rises
and hence the size of the dollar bloc expands, the exchange rate volatility of currencies that
remain floating against the dollar, that is, the yen or the euro, tends to increase.  A regional
approach to  exchange rate stability based on a  currency basket system does not promote a
particular currency bloc (be it the dollar bloc or yen bloc) and, hence, is expected to contribute to
stability of inter-bloc exchange rates. In this sense, it can reduce the volatility of East Asia's
effective exchange rates by  helping stabilize major currency exchange rates,  including the
dollar/yen and the dollar/euro rate.
2. Need for Coordinated  Action
Recent authors have stressed the existence of strategic interdependence in the choice of
exchange rate regimes for countries that, in broad terms, produce similar goods, are rivals as host
locations for FDI inflows, and compete for exports in common, third markets.  Honahan and
Lane (1999) have emphasized that exchange rate stabilization to a common anchor currency can
be regarded as strategic complements-if  a country stabilizes the exchange rate to an anchor
currency, then other neighboring countries also find it attractive to stabilize their exchange rates
against the same anchor currency. In this sense, defacto  exchange rate stabilization vis-a-vis the
US  dollar  in  East Asia  provided an  alternative to  costly  beggar-thy-neighbor competitive
depreciation strategies, making the defacto  dollar peg an attractive collective equilibrium.  This
is obviously a Nash equilibrium and, hence, the question remains whether coordination can
improve the outcome in a Pareto sense.
Benassy-Quere (1999) has considered the case for coordinated action in the context of
conflicting exchange rate objectives.  Suppose that the authorities of two identical East Asian
competitor countries are faced with a tradeoff between stabilizing the debt-weighted effective
exchange rate (with a higher share of the yen but no share for the other competitor country's
currency) and the trade weighted effective exchange rate (with a lower share of the yen and a
positive share for the other competitor country's currency).  In this case, it is shown that  a
cooperative solution is superior to the Nash equilibrium, because cooperation can allow the share
of  the  yen  to  increase by  placing the  determination of the  bilateral exchange  rate  out  of
competitive consideration. Cooperation  thus stabilizes the debt-weighted  effective exchange rate
with little loss in trade-weighted effective exchange rate stability. She argues that the low weight
of the yen in the exchange rate policies of East Asia is a result of a non-cooperative optimization
process (in which too much weight is given to bilateral competitiveness), and that cooperation
(designed to  minimize the combined loss function) would lead to a  larger share of the yen,
especially in Indonesia and Thailand, where it is an important  currency of debt denomination.21
Ogawa, Ito,  and  Sasaki (1999) have also  shown the benefit  of policy coordination.
Starting with the observation that the optimal weight depends on the weights a  neighboring
country is adopting, they have shown in an extreme case that, if one country adopts a dollar peg,
the other county may also need to adopt a dollar peg; and vice versa, the dollar peg being the
Nash equilibrium.  Altematively, a basket peg arrangement can become a Nash equilibrium, if
both countries consider adopting one.  Which of the Nash equilibria is chosen depends on inertia
and rational calculation.  On the other hand, if the countries can coordinate, they should choose
the best equilibrium.  This process can be regarded as a regional currency arrangement. 18 Both
countries would be  better off, if the  decision to  move to  a  Pareto dominant situation (i.e.,
adoption of a basket peg) were made simultaneously. A common currency basket may be a way
of overcoming coordination failure.
3. Currency Weights
There is a large theoretical literature on how to calculate optimal currency weights in a
basket (see Williamson 1982 for a survey of the literature).  Not unexpectedly, the literature
suggests that optimal weights depend on the objective of exchange rate policy, so that there can
be  consensus on  currency weights as long  as there is  agreement on the model and policy
objective.  Under  these  circumstances, a  broad  qualitative  approach  may  be  justified.
Fortunately, it is well known that exact weights make little difference in the overall performance
of a currency basket.  It is on this basis that Williamson (1999a) has proposed the inclusion of
only three major currencies in the basket, with the weights of 0.4 for the dollar and 0.3 each for
the yen and the euro, which correspond broadly to the weighted average of the extra-regional
trade of the nine East Asian countries, with Western Hemisphere  added to the US and the rest of
the world distributed among the US, Japan and Europe.  In fact, these weights are the same as
those that we have used to construct the effective exchange rate index in our structural VAR
analyses.
Some may object that the share of the yen in the Williamson basket is too small in the
light of the importance of Japan as a supplier of FDI, financial capital, official development
assistance, and capital goods, and increasingly as  a  competitor.  If the  role of Japan  as  a
competitor is emphasized, a greater weight of the yen should be called for to ensure greater
exchange rate stability within East Asia.  On this score alone, Dornbusch and Park (1999) have
even argued that a yen bloc strategy may bring important strategic advantages by cutting out
easy beggar-thy-neighbor  strategies. 19 On the other hand, Benassy-Quere (1999) has argued that,
from the standpoint of Japan as a capital goods supplier, although a depreciation against the yen
raises the competitiveness of exports, more imported capital goods are needed to produce the
additional  exports,  so  that  the  net  effect  on  the  trade  account  is  ambiguous.  Some
undervaluation, if any, of the yen probably does not make much difference.  Eichengreen and
Bayoumi (1999) note that, even for Korea, Indonesia and Thailand for which a  yen peg is
marginally preferred, as  well as for  Hong Kong and  Singapore for  which  a  dollar peg  is
marginally preferred, the common basket is almost as good as the best single currency peg.
1  For an early statement of this view, see Ohno and Shirono (1997).
19  9t  should quickly be noted, however, that they do not advocate a yen bloc on a different ground, namely, Japan's
on-going structural change would involve a significant real depreciation over the medium term.22
4. Exchange  Rate  Margins  and Flexibility
At least initially, the operation of the regional currency basket arrangement requires less
formality and greater flexibility than the EMS of 1979-98 did in Europe because, as long as the
basket only includes currencies that are external to the region (as opposed to internal currencies
in the  case of Europe's  ECU), the need for  a  formal structure of policy  coordination and
surveillance is less compelling.  20 This is an important consideration, given the currently lacking
commitment to full-fledged regional monetary cooperation in East Asia, the greater diversity in
the level of economic and financial development across countries, and the dynamic nature of
East Asian countries with rapid growth, changing economic structures, and possibly differing
inflationary tendencies.  Countries with different rates of inflation and productivity growth can
(and are expected to) adjust the reference rates with respect to the basket differently over the
medium term.  In the absence of sufficient nominal convergence, adjustment for inflation may be
just as important as the choice of the basket itself (Ohno 1999).
Given the  need for flexibility, Williamson (1  999b) envisages that  each country can
choose its own exchange rate system with respect to the common basket.  Hong Kong SAR, for
example, can continue to use a currency board arrangement, except that the dollar is replaced by
the basket. For most countries, however, the combination of a crawl and a band is considered to
be the norm. Dombusch and Park (1999) have called this arrangement "BBC" (for "band, basket
and crawl") which presumably "offers the desirable possibility of flexibility of nominal rates
without sacrificing the predictability of real exchange rates." In their view, however, the BBC
proposal is only a "learning mechanism and operating setting" in transition to a more flexible
regime.  This is where they depart from the spirit of the Williamson (I 999b) proposal and our
own view that a regional peg to a common basket should ideally become a catalyst for greater
nominal convergence and greater exchange rate stability within East Asia.  In the meantime,
however, a formal exchange rate regime is of less importance. Whatever  the formal arrangement
may be (be it a flexible exchange rate regime or a managed float), the important point is that
each country in the region should stabilize the real effective exchange rate at normal times by
targeting a common currency basket.
In time of a currency crisis, some countries may find it necessary to allow for greater
exchange rate  flexibility.  In  such a  situation, credibility for exchange rate  stability can be
maintained by  establishing  what  McKinnon (1999) has  called  "the  restoration  rule":  the
authorities are allowed to suspend the peg (or quasi-peg) temporarily when faced with a massive
speculative attack, subject to the condition that the exchange rate will be restored back to the
original parity as soon as practical.  It has already been noted that, while the exchange rates of
industrial countries are generally regressive,  those of developing countries are not, with moderate
devaluation leading  to  a  loss  of  confidence.  The  restoration rule  is  a  way  of  instilling
regressivity into developing country exchange rates even when a rare and extreme event calls for
a  temporary  suspension of  the  peg.  The  restoration rule  not  only  makes  exchange  rate
expectations (hence the actual exchange rates) more regressive, but also may well diminish the
potential for speculative attack to begin with.  We depart from McKinnon, however, in that if the
20 Nonetheless,  some  consultation  and surveillance  processes  among  the  participating  countries  are desirable.  For
technical  issues related  to the operation  of a basket peg, see Takagi (1988).23
shock is sufficiently large and permanent, the post-crisis rate may need to be set  at a  level
consistent with the new equilibrium. 21
5. Compatibility with Inflation Targeting
In recent years, a number of countries, including some in East Asia (such as Korea and
Thailand), have adopted inflation targeting as a means of securing a nominal anchor under
flexible exchange rate regimes.  The policy  of pre-announcing target  ranges  for  inflation,
moreover, is expected to serve as a way of imposing accountability on central banks, as they
have assumed greater independence in these countries. Within the present context of East Asia,
the  policy  of  exchange  rate  flexibility combined  with  inflation targeting  may well  be  a
reasonable mechanism of securing stable prices and exchange rates.  In our view, the type of
regional  monetary  arrangement we  are  proposing  in  this  paper  is  compatible  with  the
appropriately defined policy of inflation targeting.
In general, there is a limit to the ability of monetary authorities to pursue both nominal
exchange rate  targets  and  inflation targets, when  there  is  a  commitment to  open  capital
accounts.22  However, if  inflation targeting is  defined as a  policy of achieving a  weighted
average of inflation rates of the United States, Japan and the European Union and if nominal
exchange rate targeting is defined as a policy of stabilizing the nominal exchange rate vis-a-vis a
basket of the US dollar, the Japanese yen and the euro, then these two policies are in fact one and
the same, at least in the long term when purchasing power parity (PPP) tends to hold.
Admittedly, one of the key benefits of the currency basket approach-avoiding  changes
in the real effective exchange rate that  are brought about by  fluctuations in the US  dollar-
Japanese yen  rate-could  also  be  achieved in  principle with  an  exchange rate  float  and
appropriately defined inflation targeting.  However, floating exchange rates have a tendency to
display short-term volatility and medium-term misalignment and, as a result, can induce large
fluctuations in intra-regional exchange rates. In the short term, the asset market tends to respond
to news and shocks more rapidly than does the goods market, thereby often creating exchange
rate overshooting and deviations from PPP as well as causing volatile fluctuations in the nominal
exchange rate.  In the medium term, as pointed out earlier, currency misalignment can persist
particularly under a flexible exchange rate regime.  Hence, inflation targeting by itself will not
guarantee intra-regional exchange rate  stability in  the short to  medium term.  Given these
problems associated with a floating rate regime, a policy of nominal exchange rate targeting
(with some bands) can better ensure exchange rate stability in a way consistent with inflation
targeting (with some bands). This is particularly the case for East Asia where the economies are
small and relatively open so that domestic price inflation reflects international price movements.
In essence, a "soft" peg to a basket of the tri-polar currencies can minimize both short-term
This was particularly the case in East Asia where a  large shock caused massive insolvency problems in the
corporate sector and serious NPL problems in the financial system, requiring permanently weaker real exchange
rates for adjustment.
~2  If assets denominated in different currencies are imperfect substitutes,  however, the impossibility  theorem, i.e., the
impossibility of pursuing three simultaneous policy objectives of free capital mobility, exchange rate stability and
monetary  policy independence, does not hold even with free mobility of capital.24
volatility and medium-term misalignment of exchange rates, while maintaining a targeted range
of inflation rates.
6. Political and Institutional Considerations
In the final analysis, the success of any regional arrangement crucially depends on the
strength of political commitment.  In this  connection, some authors have argued that, in an
analogy to the case of individual countries, regional exchange rate pegs are "dangerous" in the
absence  of  "the  requisite political  commitment" (Bayoumi, Eichengreen and  Mauro  2000;
Eichengreen and Bayoumi 1999). This and other similar views, however, seem to overstate the
case for the required degree of political commitment for the type of regional arrangement being
proposed.  It is true that any regional arrangement would involve a series of political decisions
that constitute an intergovernmental  agreement. However, in our proposal, once the agreement is
reached on the composition of the basket and the broad commitment to use it as a reference
value, everything else is pretty much left to the discretion of the country authorities. This is not
much different from most of the exchange rate arrangements currently in place, except that the
US dollar is replaced by a common basket as the anchor currency.
This, however, does not mean that East Asia will not benefit from developing a more
organized coordination framework for regional policy surveillance and consultation as time goes
on.  To the extent that the purpose of regional monetary cooperation is, first and foremost, to
stabilize intra-regional exchange rates, there must ideally be a mechanism of ensuring that no
country jeopardize this objective by taking unilateral action that is completely out of line with
those pursued in the rest of the region. The mechanism of regional surveillance and consultation
becomes all the more important if Japan (whose currency is an element of the common basket
and whose potential role is to provide international liquidity in the event of a regional currency
crisis) is included in the regional exchange rate arrangement.  As the actions of Japan directly
influence the external value of the common basket, there must necessarily be a mechanism by
which they can be subjected to the scrutiny of other participating countries. 23 We have already
seen that the participation of Japan in the East Asian regional arrangement may be beneficial, as
East Asia is much more self-contained as a defacto trading bloc with Japan than without it. The
region will also benefit from the voluntary participation of the United States and the European
Union in  policy surveillance and  consultation.  The usefulness of their participation in the
mechanism of regional monetary cooperation  must be examined against the costs associated with
the greater diffusion of the mechanism itself, in light of the extent of their commitment to the
regional cooperation process.
As  the region becomes more integrated and hence more prepared, in  terms of  both
economic criteria and political climate, for a  more permanent commitment to  economic and
monetary union, greater efforts should be made to build institutions capable of supporting such a
commitment. Given the endogeneity of the OCA criteria, the process can be self-promoting.  In
this regard, we are already witnessing the seeds of important institutional developments in East
Asia, particularly  in  ASEAN, including the ASEAN Finance Ministers'  Meeting,  EMEAP
23 In this sense, a regional surveillance mechanism requires mutual consultation  among the participating countries
about their economic performance and policies, including those of developed nations, and hence differs in nature
from the IMF's bilateral consultation process based on Article IV.25
(which organizes high level meetings and hosts working groups on financial markets, central
bank operations, and prudential supervision), and the Four and Six Markets Meetings.  More
recently, in 1995, the monetary authorities of Hong Kong SAR, Indonesia and Thailand made
US  dollar  repurchase  agreements,  with  Japan,  the  Philippines  and  Singapore joining
subsequently.  In November 1997, the East Asian economies and other Asia-Pacific countries,
including the United States and Canada, formed the Manila Framework Group to institutionalize
the surveillance process in the region.  In May 2000, ASEAN, Japan, China and Korea made a
historical statement, announcing the establishment and enhancement of swap facilities among the
East Asian countries, as a way of complementing the existing international facilities.  These
institutions may be insufficient in their current form.  Even so, they are important steps toward a
more permanent institutional framework  for regional exchange rate stability in East Asia, which
may include institutions comparable to the European Monetary Cooperative Fund (EMCF) and
the  European  Monetary  Institute  (EMI)  which  played  significant roles  in  the  monetary
integration of Europe.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper has discussed major conceptual issues relevant to the exchange rate policies of
East Asian countries and proposed a regional exchange rate arrangement designed to promote
intra-regional exchange rate stability and regional growth.  In particular, it has argued that: (1)
for developing countries, exchange rate volatility tends to have significantly adverse effects on
trade and investment, making it inadvisable to adopt a system of freely floating exchange rates;
(2) a system that ensures intra-regional exchange rate stability will be beneficial for East Asia to
promote trade, FDI and economic growth; (3) in terms of various economic criteria, East Asia is
no less ready for a regional monetary arrangement than Europe was before EMIU;  furthermore,
the celebrated OCA criteria are likely to  be endogenous, so that the very act of  forming a
regional monetary arrangement will enhance the suitability of East Asia for such an arrangement;
(4) given the high degree of intra-regional trade and the similarity of trade composition in East
Asia,  each economy's  exchange rate  policy should be  directed towards maintaining  intra-
regional exchange rate stability; and (5) in view of the sub-optimality of the current de facto
dollar peg  policy  as  an  informal and  uncoordinated mechanism of  ensuring  intra-regional
stability, a  coordinated action may  be  profitably employed to  shift  the target  of  nominal
exchange rate stability to a common currency basket, consisting of the US dollar, the Japanese
yen and the euro, which is broadly representative of the diversity of trade and FDI structure.
At least initially, a regional peg to the common basket does not have to be rigid.  Each
country may choose its own formal exchange rate arrangement, provided that the common basket
serves as the reference anchor in the conduct of exchange rate policy, be it a currency board, a
managed float or a  basket peg  with wide margins.  In a  time of  crisis, the exchange rate
stabilization policy may be temporarily suspended, subject to the expectations that the exchange
rate will be restored to its original parity (for a small shock) or a new parity (for a large shock) as
soon as practical.  Such an arrangement is likely to contribute to the simultaneous stabilization of
intra-regional exchange rates as well as individual countries' effective exchange rates, in a way
consistent with the continued medium-terrn objective of promoting trade, investment and growth
in  the  region, and  is  a  pragmatic policy option  for  East Asia  until  greater  political  and
institutional developments create an environment conducive to  a  more robust framework of26
monetary and exchange rate cooperation.  Over time, greater efforts should be made to build
institutions for mutual policy surveillance and consultation, which will be supportive of fostering
such a framework, including the East Asian counterparts of the EMCF and the EMI.27
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Table  1.  Trade  Intensity  in East Asia  and  Western  Europe,  1995
ia)  Trade Intensity Indices in East Asia, 1995




China  0.18  1.09  --
Hong Kong SAR  0.13  0.83  9.37  --
Indonesia  0.75  5.96  1.39  0.98  --
Japan  4.25  0.64  2.33  1.53  3.75  --
Korea  3.40  0.00  2.23  1.63  3.01  2.72  --
Laos  0.00  15.92  2.14  0.26  0.20  0.52  0.00  --
Malaysia  3.36  3.43  0.72  1.08  1.64  2.37  1.38  0.08  --
Myanmar  0.25  0.00  8.05  1.12  5.20  1.04  0.00  0.00  5.62  --
Philippines  0.80  0.04  0.91  1.80  1.84  2.89  1.73  0.00  1.40  0.14  --
Singapore  11.92  13.12  0.92  1.91  2.07  1.90  1.78  1.96  10.93  11.25  2.73  --
Taiwan Province of Chin  0.79  0.90  0.57  4.36  2.16  2.78  1.29  0.55  1.69  0.91  2.33  1.93
Thailand  5.53  22.14  0.95  1.09  1.54  3.25  1.09  39.79  2.43  0.94  2.15  5.22  1.75
Vietnam  0.01  42.75  2.42  1.71  2.53  2.12  4.30  78.69  1.67  0.00  2.34  7.02  4.60  3.05
United States (US)  0.30  0.14  0.94  1.15  0.91  1.91  1.54  0.06  1.22  0.22  1.88  1.20  1.67  1.02  0.21
European Union (EU)  0.29  0.07  0.34  0.35  0.46  0.40  0.33  0.26  0.36  0.18  0.34  0.33  0.35  0.41  0.27  0.50
(b) Trade Intensity Indices in Western Europe, 1995
Austria  Belgium-  enmark  Finland  France  ermany  Greece  Ireland  Italy  Netherlands  Portugal  Spain  Sweden  UK  US  Japan
Luxembourg
Austria
Belgium-Luxembourg  0.82  --
Denmark  0.96  0.96  --
Finland  0.99  0.98  4.19  --
France  0.89  2.95  1.05  0.78  --
Germranr  4.41  2.18  2.46  1.53  2.06  --
Greece  1.12  1.09  1.37  1.15  1.38  1.81  --
Ireland  0.44  1.03  1.21  0.94  1.33  1.20  1.10  --
Italy  2.18  1.35  1.05  0.78  2.50  2.07  4.03  0.82
Nctherlands  0.98  3.65  1.55  1.26  1.58  2.48  1.47  1.52  1.08  --
Portugal  0.71  1.10  1.71  1.07  2.34  1.80  0.77  0.63  1.75  1.24
Spain  0.83  1.14  0.89  1.02  3.56  1.66  1.82  0.93  2.39  1.16  10.04  --
Sweden  1.10  1.41  8.08  8.54  1.01  1.71  1.01  1.25  0.89  1.57  1.19  0.89
United Kingdom (UK)  0.60  1.61  1.57  1.96  1.74  1.47  1.21  5.93  1.25  1.89  1.70  1.64  1.96
United States (US)  0.24  0.49  0.30  0.44  0.42  0.48  0.39  0.77  0.47  0.47  0.26  0.35  0.51  0.88
Japan  0.23  0.33  0.43  0.49  0.28  0.48  0.28  0.61  0.31  0.44  0.22  0.25  0.40  0.55  1.91
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, various Issues.32
Table 2. Openness in East Asia and the European Union Countries
(Total Trade as a Ratio of GDP)
(a) East Asia  (percent)
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998
Brunei Darussalam  89.5  101.3  96.4  97.9  93.8  85.6  91.0  85.3  83.4
Cambodia  n.a.  n.a.  35.8  37.5  51.2  69.5  54.6  58.3  62.8
Indonesia  41.5  42.9  44.0  41.2  40.7  42.6  40.8  44.1  80.9
Laos  30.5  25.9  35.7  50.7  56.0  51.0  54.0  61.7  73.1
Malaysia  137.3  150.9  138.3  144.6  163.4  173.6  155.4  157.5  181.6
Myanmar  2.5  3.6  2.9  2.4  2.1  2.1  1.6  1.6  1.5
Philippines  47.7  47.7  47.6  55.0  56.1  61.8  65.8  77.3  93.6
Singapore  309.8  292.1  277.3  277.0  286.1  290.4  280.3  270.6  254.3
Thailand  65.7  67.2  65.6  66.3  69.1  75.7  70.6  80.7  87.5
Vietnam  54.2  43.2  50.8  50.6  60.0  62.9  76.3  73.1  n.a.
China  32.5  36.0  39.6  44.9  43.6  39.7  35.5  36.2  33.8
Hong Kong SAR  220.2  231.1  241.2  236.1  239.5  263.2  246.1  228.5  215.4
Korea  53.4  52.0  50.3  48.0  49.3  53.2  53.8  58.9  70.3
Taiwan Province of China  76.1  77.6  72.4  72.7  74.0  82.7  79.7  83.0  82.7
Japan  _  17.6  16.2  15.4  14.1  14.3  15.2  16.5  18.1  17.7
(b) European Union  (percent)
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998
Austria  56.6  55.1  52.6  48.6  51.2  53.7  54.9  59.9  61.8
Belgium  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  112.3  117.9  122.6  126.4  135.7  137.0
Denmark  50.5  51.0  51.8  48.8  50.3  52.4  51.4  54.0  53.1
Finland  39.7  37.0  42.5  49.1  54.0  53.8  54.2  57.7  60.9
France  37.7  37.4  36.0  33.1  35.2  36.9  30.9  40.3  41.8
Germany  n.a.  46.1  41.8  38.1  39.7  41.1  42.0  45.8  47.6
Greece  33.6  34.0  33.6  33.0  28.5  29.2  27.2  26.9  19.3
Ireland  97.6  97.3  97.4  104.1  110.2  118.4  117.4  120.2  133.2
Italy  32.2  30.6  30.1  32.1  35.5  40.4  37.9  39.3  39.6
Luxembourg  129.4  125.4  113.0  102.8  100.3  99.4  95.7  99.8  88.1
Netherlands  91.0  89.9  85.4  84.3  88.0  93.7  95.2  102.7  101.9
Portugal  60.3  54.6  51.5  47.4  51.4  54.0  54.9  58.3  57.4
Spain  29.1  28.7  28.5  29.4  34.1  36.5  38.4  42.7  43.8
Sweden  48.7  44.0  42.9  49.8  57.0  62.5  62.7  65.3  67.6
United Kingdom  42.0  39.0  39.3  41.1  42.2  45.8  47.6  45.8  43.2
Note:  Openness is defined as the ratio of total trade (exports plus imports) to nominal GDP.
Sources:  IMF, International  Financial  Statistics;  and World Bank data base.33
Table 3. Regional Breakdown  of East Asian Trade, Average for 1990-98 (share of total)
(a) Exports  (percent)
Exporters \ Exports to  ASEAN  Other EA  EA-14  EA-14 & J.  Japan  US  EU  ROW
Brunei Darussalam  21.1  16.3  37.4  93.0  55.6  2.7  2.2  2.1
Cambodia  56.8  5.5  62.3  69.0  6.7  6.0  18.6  6.4
Indonesia  14.2  16.6  30.8  60.1  29.3  13.8  14.5  11.5
Laos  46.5  5.3  51.9  62.6  10.7  2.6  18.0  16.8
Malaysia  28.2  13.6  41.7  54.9  13.2  19.2  14.8  11.0
Myanmar  22.2  20.4  42.6  50.0  7.4  7.2  8.4  34.4
Philippines  10.1  11.4  21.5  38.5  17.0  36.5  18.2  6.7
Singapore  26.1  17.2  43.2  50.9  7.7  19.6  14.4  15.1
Thailand  17.3  11.0  28.3  44.8  16.5  20.7  18.2  16.3
Vietnam  20.3  18.1  38.4  62.8  24.4  2.0  12.2  23.0
China  6.3  35.4  41.7  58.4  16.7  15.1  12.2  14.2
Hong Kong SAR  6.6  36.2  42.8  48.5  5.7  22.7  16.1  12.7
Korea  12.4  16.4  28.8  42.8  14.0  21.4  12.8  23.0
Taiwan Province of China  11.7  22.6  34.3  45.2  11.0  27.0  15.0  12.8
ASEAN  22.1  14.9  37.0  52.4  15.4  19.1  15.2  13.3
EA-14  13.6  23.7  37.2  50.1  12.9  20.7  14.5  14.6
EA-14 & Japan  13.8  23.2  37.0  45.4  8.3  23.7  15.6  15.3
(b) Imports  (percent)
Importersl Imports from  ASEAN  Other EA  EA-14  EA-14 & J.  Japan  US  EU  ROW
BruneiDarussalam  41.5  6.3  47.8  58.6  10.8  14.0  21.4  6.0
Cambodia  57.5  13.6  71.2  81.1  9.9  1.6  9.7  7.6
Indonesia  11.5  15.6  27.2  49.2  22.1  11.8  20.2  18.7
Laos  61.8  8.8  70.6  80.0  9.4  0.5  3.7  15.8
Malaysia  19.9  13.7  33.7  58.5  24.9  16.6  14.2  10.6
Myanmar  41.7  31.6  73.2  82.7  9.5  1.4  9.0  7.0
Philippines  11.3  17.6  28.9  50.1  21.2  19.5  11.0  19.4
Singapore  21.2  13.9  35.2  55.2  20.0  16.3  13.4  15.1
Thailand  13.1  13.0  26.1  54.6  28.4  12.1  15.2  18.2
Vietnam  28.4  26.4  54.8  64.7  9.9  1.0  10.2  24.0
China  7.0  29.2  36.1  55.6  19.5  11.7  15.0  17.7
Hong Kong SAR  9.1  50.7  59.9  75.1  15.2  7.6  10.3  7.0
Korea  8.0  7.5  15.5  38.5  23.0  22.2  13.1  26.2
Taiwan Province of China  9.9  7.9  17.7  46.2  28.5  21.0  14.9  17.8
ASEAN  18.0  14.6  32.7  55.2  22.6  14.8  14.5  15.5
EA-14  12.1  22.5  34.6  56.0  21.4  14.6  13.5  15.8
EA-14 & Japan  12.7  21.5  34.2  49.4  15.3  17.0  13.8  19.8
(c) Total Trade (Exports plus Imports)  (percent)
Trading Economies\ Trade witl  ASEAN  Other EA  EA-14  EA-14 & J.  Japan  US  EU  ROW
Brunei Darussalam  30.2  11.8  42.0  78.4  36.4  7.3  10.4  3.9
Cambodia  58.8  10.6  69.4  78.4  9.0  3.5  11.6  6.5
Indonesia  12.9  16.2  29.1  55.1  26.0  13.0  17.1  14.8
Laos  55.3  7.6  62.9  74.0  11.1  1.2  8.5  16.3
Malaysia  24.0  13.6  37.7  56.6  19.0  17.9  14.6  10.8
Myanmar  34.8  27.8  62.6  71.3  8.7  3.3  8.7  16.6
Philippines  10.8  15.1  25.9  45.4  19.5  26.3  13.9  14.3
Singapore  23.5  15.5  39.1  53.1  14.1  17.9  13.9  15.1
Thailand  15.1  12.1  27.2  50.2  23.0  16.0  16.6  17.3
Vietnam  24.8  23.0  47.8  64.1  16.3  1.4  11.0  23.5
China  6.6  32.4  39.0  57.1  18.1  13.5  13.5  15.9
Hong Kong SAR  7.9  43.7  51.6  62.1  10.6  15.0  13.1  9.8
Korea  10.1  11.9  22.0  40.6  18.6  21.7  13.0  24.6
TaiwanProvinceofChina  10.8  15.6  26.5  45.7  19.2  24.2  15.0  15.1
ASEAN  19.9  14.7  34.7  53.8  19.1  16.9  14.8  14.5
EA-14  12.8  23.1  35.9  53.0  17.2  17.7  14.1  15.2
EA-14 & Japan  13.3  22.4  35.6  47.3  11.7  20.5  14.8  17.5
Notes: (a) Other EA includes China, Hong Kong SAR, Korea and Taiwan POC. EA-14 includes ASEAN and other EA.
(b) ROW is the rest of the world.
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics.34
Table 4.  Manufacturing Trade in East Asia, 1990 and 1997
(Share  of Total  Trade)
1990  1997
Exports  Imports  Total Trade  Exports  Imports  Total Trade
Brunei Darussalam  2.6  78.4  26.2  1.3  82.5  39.5
Cambodia  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
Indonesia  37.0  78.0  55.8  43.3  74.7  57.1
Laos  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
Malaysia  55.4  80.2  67.8  76.8  85.0  80.8
Myanmar  3.8  58.6  39.4  12.4  57.7  43.4
Philippines  41.4  54.5  49.4  84.6  78.5  80.8
Singapore  72.3  74.8  73.6  85.2  83.7  84.5
Thailand  63.7  76.5  71.2  71.2  79.6  75.6
Vietnam  28.6  13.2  20.4  20.6  22.1  21.5
China  72.3  80.8  76.2  86.7  79.4  83.5
Hong Kong SAR  92.5  84.5  88.5  93.9  88.3  90.9
Korea  93.8  65.9  79.3  89.4  67.1  77.4
Taiwan Province of China  93.5  70.9  83.3  95.6  76.0  86.1
Japan  96.6  46.8  74.2  95.4  56.9  78.3
Notes: (a) Manufacturing goods are defined by SITC 5+6+7+8.
(b) Latest data are available for Brunei Darussalam, 1994; Vietnam, 1995; Malaysia, Myanmar,
Philippines, and Korea, 1996.
Sources: UN, International Trade Statistics Yearbook;
Taiwan Province of China, Statistical Yearbook  of the Republic of China.
Table 5.  FDI Inflows to East Asia, 1990-98
(millions of $US; percent of total)
Recipients  ASEAN (a)  China  Korea  Taiwan POC  Total
Investors
Japan  57,693  29,715  2,769  4,935  95,112
(19.2)  (5.5)  (10.5)  (22.7)  (10.7)
USA  35,082  42,658  9,331  3,885  90,956
(11.7)  (7.9)  (35.3)  (17.8)  (10.3)
Europe (b)  40,375  27,311  8,935  2,484  79,105
(13.4)  (5.1)  (33.8)  (11.4)  (8.9)
ASEAN  27,493  33,421  3,271  1,108  65,293
(9.  1)  (6.2)  (12.4)  (5.1)  (7.4)
Other East Asia (c)  46,731  336,132  551  1,571  384,985
(15.5)  (62.4)  (2.1)  (7.2)  (43.4)
Total, including others  301,074  538,477  26,422  21,778  887,751
_  _  _  (100.0)  (100.0)  (100.0)  (100.0)  (100.0)
Notes: (a)  1991-98 for Brunei and Vietnam; 1992-98  for the Philippines; and 1994-98 for Cambodia
(b) Authors' estimates. These figures underestimate  the actual volumes because some
countries with small volumes are not included.
(c)  Hong Kong SAR, Korea, and Taiwan POC only.
Sources:  ASEAN Secretariat,  ASEAN Investment  Report 1999: Trends and Developments in Foreign Direct Investme
Japan External Trade Organization35
TABLE  6.  Major  Economic  Characteristics  of the East  Asian  Economies,  1999
GDP  Population  Area  GDP/POP  Trade Openness  Distribution  of GDP  Savings and Investment  Fiscal Balance  and Debt  Financial  Deepening
(POP)  (Ratio  of GDP)  (Ratio of GDP)  (Ratio of  GDP)  (Ratio of GDP)  (Ratio  of GDP)
Mid-Year  Exports  Imports  Total  Agr.  Ind.  Manut.)  Serv.  GDS  GDI  Current  Fiscal  Public  Externa  MI  M2  SMC
Account  Balance  Debt  Debt
USSMillion  Million  1000 Km2  US$  %  %  %  %  %  %  %  %  %  %  %  %  %  %  %
Japan  4,348,950  126.5  377  34,376  9.6  7.2  16.8  1.7  37.2  24.3  61.1  27.8  26.1  1 6  -9.2  125.4  ---  48.4  125.7  57.4
Australia  393,991  19 0  7,682  20,769  14.2  17.5  31.8  3.2  26.2  14.0  70 6  22.6  24.8  -2.7  0.4  21 3  ---  20.6  70.6  221.9
NewZealand  53,933  3.8  268  14,156  23.1  26.5  49.6  7.4  26.0  18.5  66.6  19.4  20.4  -1.0  0.5  37.0  . 14.4  93.9  165.7
China  991,200  1,266.8  9,326  782  197  16.7  36.4  18.4  48.7  37.1  32.9  390  38.3  2.9  -2.1  29.0  16.4  61.9  147.5  33.4
HongKongSAR  158,845  6.8  1  23,223  109.5  113.0  222.5  0.1  14.7  65  85.2  29.9  25.4  4.6  -25  n.a.  20.9  15.0  222.8  216.2
Korea  406,940  46.9  99  8,684  35.6  29.4  65.0  4.9  43.5  30.7  51.6  33 6  26.8  6.8  -4.6  29.5  44.0  9.2  68.1  75.8
TaiwanPOC  288,576  22.0  36  13,117  42.1  38.4  80.6  2.9  34.1  27.1  63.0  26.1  24.3  1.8  0.1  n.a.  11.8  48.4  190.6  126.6
Cambodia  3,008  11.0  177  275  23 8  35.7  59.5  50.6  14.8  6.2  34.6  5.5  15.0  -9.5  -4.4  n.a.  77.7  5 1  11.4  ---
Indonesia  140,964  209.3  1,812  674  34.5  17.0  51.6  19.5  45.3  24.9  35.2  19.5  11.6  7.9  -I  8  91.5  176.5  10.3  57.8  45.5
Lao, RPD  1,292  5.3  231  250  28.6  42.8  71.4  52.6  22.0  16.7  25.4  23.7  24.9  -1.2  -15.8  n.a.  199.1  4.0  20.3  ---
Malaysia  78,735  22.7  329  3,467  107.3  82.5  189.8  13.2  43.6  28.7  43.3  47.1  22.4  24.7  -3.2  52.0  65.3  25.3  105.9  184.7
Myanmar  253,781  45.1  658  5,703  0.4  1.1  1.5  46.9  8.5  6.3  37.8  12.1  12.8  -0.6  -4.5  n.a.  3.0  17.5  26.9  ---
Philippines  76,468  74.8  298  1,023  47.8  42.6  90.4  16.9  31.6  21.9  51 5  14.6  18.8  0.4  -3.7  105.0  70.1  13.2  62.9  62.9
Singapore  84,947  3.9  1  21,837  135.0  130.7  265.8  0.1  35.2  23.2  64.6  499  33.5  17.8  10 1  71.6  16.7  21.6  121.2  111.2
Thailand  124,371  61.8  511  2,012  43.8  35.9  79.7  11.2  412  32.1  47.7  33.4  21.0  11.8  -3.3  503  76.4  15.7  106.7  46.9
Vietnam  28,500  76.6  325  372  34.4  41.9  76.3  25.4  34.5  17.9  40.1  214  28.7  -7.3  -- 0.9  4.1  82.3  12.5  242  ---
Ref  United States  9,256,100  273.1  9,159  33,889  7.6  11.4  19.0  1.7  26.2  17.8  72.0  14.8  17.5  -2.7  1 7  26.4  ---  15.8  61.8  145.3
Notes:  (a) GDS = Gross domestic  savings; GDI = Gross domestic investment;  CA = Current account;  SMC = Stock market capitalization.
(b) GDP data for  Laos and Myanmar are those  of 1998.
(c) Trade opennes data for Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam are those of  1998; and 1997 for Cambodia.
(d) Distribution  of GDP is for 1998, except in Japan,  USA and Hong Kong (1997), Australia  (1996), and New Zealand  (1994).
(e) The savings rates of Cambodia,  Laos, Myanmar, Singapore and Vietnama are for 1998.
(f) The fiscal balance  data are: Australia,  1997; New Zealand, 1998; Hong Kong. Indonesia, Cambodia,  Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam are those  of  1998.
(g) The public debt data are: Australia and New Zealand,  1997; and Vietnam,  1994.
(h) The external debt data are: Australia,  1997; Hong Kong, Myanmar, Singapore,  and Taiwan those of  1997; and 1998 for other developing  countries.
(i) Money supply data for Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietname are those  of 1998.
Sources: International  Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics
World Bank,  World Development Indicator;  and Worlbank database.
Asian Development Bank, Key Indicators  of Developing Asian and Pacific  Countrie,s1999.
Central Bank of China  (Taiwan District), Financial Statisitcs and Monthly Bulletin  of Statistics
World Bank, East Asia, Recovery and Beyond  2000.36
Figure  1.  The East  Asian  Economies'  Exchange  Rate  Movements
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Figure 2. Impulse Responses to a Shock to Real Effective Exchange Rates:
Full Sample
(a) China,  1979-1998
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Figure 2. Impulse Responses to a Shock to Real Effective Exchange Rates:
Full Sample (Continued)
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Figure 2. Impulse Responses to a Shock to Real Effective Exchange Rates:
Full Sample (Continued)
(g) Singapore,  1970-1998
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Figure 3.  Impulse Responses to a Shock to Real Effective Exchange Rates:
Pre-Crisis Sample (Continued)
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Figure 4.  Normalized  Impulse Responses  to a Shock to Real Effective Exchange Rates:
Full Sample









1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10
-| Reai  GDP  - - -Real  Effective  Exchange  Rate  Price












1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10
F-4-Real  GDP  - - It  - - Real Effective  Exchange Rate -i--Pice,
(c) Indonesia,  1970-1998







1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10
I  Real GDP - - I.  - -Real Effective Exchange  Rate ---  rc43







0  - -
-0.2
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10
--- _  -- Real GDP - - -Real  Effective  Exchange  Rate -4--Pri




0.2  2  3  4





12  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10
-- Real  GDP - - U--Real  Effective Exchange Rtate -~-Price7










1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10
F-4  Real  GDP - - U  - Real  Effective  Exchange  Rate  -Price ~~_  ._  _ _  _ ________44












1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10
_ -Real  GDP - - -Real Effective  Exchange  Rate - Price















1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10
]_ ReaI  GDP -U-  *  - -Real Effective_Exchange  Rate  Price








1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10
~Real  GDP - - U.--Real  Effective  Exchange Rate  Pricej45









1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10








1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10
I_Real  GDP  it  - -Real Effective Exchange Rate  +  Pricel








1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10
|+  Real  GDP - ^ *  - -Real Effective Exchange Rate  Price46
Figure  5.  Normalized  Impulse  Responses  to a Shock  to Real  Effective  Exchange  Rates:
Pre-Crisis  Sample  (Continued)
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